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ON RACE, GENDER, AND RADICAL TORT REFORM:
A REVIEW OF MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B.
WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER,
AND TORT LAW

VINCENT R. JOHNSON*
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The Measure of Injury1 is an intellectual tour de force of genderand race-based jurisprudence applied to critical issues in the law of
torts. Destined to become a landmark in legal scholarship, this book
deserves to be widely read, discussed, and debated. In their compact,
but rich and provocative volume, the authors—Martha Chamallas of
Ohio State University and Jennifer B. Wriggins of the University of
Maine—shed light on numerous issues related to the law governing
accidents and intentional injuries.
* Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. B.A.,
LL.D., St. Vincent College; J.D. University of Notre Dame; LL.M., Yale University.
Professor Johnson is the author of Advanced Tort Law: A Problem Approach (LexisNexis,
2010); Studies in American Tort Law (Carolina Academic Press, 4th ed. 2009) (with Alan
Gunn); and Mastering Torts: A Student’s Guide to the Law of Torts (Carolina Academic
Press, 4th ed. 2009). Two students at St. Mary’s University School of Law assisted in the
preparation of this review: Haley O’Neill and Trevor Andrew Hall.
1. MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE,
GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010) [hereinafter THE MEASURE OF INJURY].
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The text engages the reader both directly and indirectly. Not only
do the authors raise numerous important issues, but the spirit of the
book soon causes the reader to formulate other questions about how
the tort system works and what it achieves. Although The Measure of
Injury is focused more on “deconstruction” than “reconstruction,” and
furnishes only limited specific proposals for reform,2 the book offers
insights into the American tort system and the challenges it faces.
Even readers who differ with the authors’ analysis will likely admit
that Chamallas and Wriggins are asking important questions that too
often are not raised.
I. A RADICAL CHALLENGE TO EXISTING TORT LAW
Persons perusing The Measure of Injury should not necessarily
expect an “easy read.” The volume is highly intellectual, and generally
assumes familiarity with not only the main features of American tort
law, but with numerous key points on which scholarly and professional
opinions differ regarding what the law should be. The authors’ arguments are carefully reasoned, lucidly explained, and abundantly
supported by citations to theoretical literature and primary sources.
Law professors are undoubtedly one target audience. It is easy to
picture The Measure of Injury as the focus of law school seminars.
Practicing lawyers, sitting judges, and other readers more immediately
interested in what courts and legislatures do today, than in what
scholars say or what legal history teaches, might not persevere until
they reach the heart of the argument. This is because the early
sections of the book offer a detailed, but inevitably dense, discussion
which locates the authors’ thesis within a broader theoretical context.
However, the initial daunting geography of schools of legal theory soon
gives way to a fascinating landscape where the discussions center on
many of the most important torts topics of the twenty-first century and
earlier eras.
A. Identity-Based Scholarship
The authors explain that they draw upon feminist theory
(including “liberal, cultural, radical, and intersectional feminism” 3),

2. See id. at 6 (describing the authors’ “advice on reforming tort law [as] limited and
highly contextual”).
3. Id. at 25.
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critical race theory4 (including the practices of “asking the ‘race subordination question,’ ” 5 appreciating the “racial implications of neutrally
phrased doctrines,” 6 and requiring justification of “disparate impact” 7),
and general critical theory8 (including “postmodernism” 9). Chamallas
and Wriggins reject the adequacy of the “law and economics” and
“corrective justice” paradigms,10 and take “for granted” much of the
“Realist legacy.” 11 As the authors explain, “this book . . . falls under the
genre of identity-based scholarship.” 12
One of the things that makes the book so energetic is that the
authors occasionally volley between being seemingly mainstream and
revolutionarily challenging. For example, in one paragraph they say
that they “start from an assumption that tort rules ought to be evaluated by their ‘real world’ success . . . rather than by some measure of
internal logic or consistency.” 13 This statement is unlikely to alarm
many old-style “Restatement-type scholars” 14 (i.e., “the torts establishment” 15) who believe “that ‘the function of tort law is [to] compensate
and deter.’ ” 16 Yet in the next two paragraphs, the authors assert that
they are “highly critical of the Restatement approach and the implicit
tort theory that underlies it,” 17 and that their goal is to effect “a
change in the ‘deep structures’ of tort law . . . that . . . reflect and
reinforce the social subordination of women and racial minorities.” 18
B. Prioritizing Emotional Harm and Relationships
The authors make clear early in the book that their quest is
radical in the sense of going to the root. They challenge “the dual
premises that accidental injury lies at the core of tort law and that
physical injury, rather than emotional harm or injuries to relationships, is of paramount concern.” 19 Thus, they contest what they insist20
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 13, 26-28.
Id. at 27 (citation omitted).
Id.
THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 24.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 14-17.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 8.
THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 20.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 20.
Id.
THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 2.
At various junctures, the authors argue that the subject of intentional tort liability
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are the well-entrenched (and misguided) suppositions that the law of
negligence (rather than intentional torts) is the primary focal point in
American tort law,21 and that tort law is mainly about liability for
physical harm to persons and property damage.22
II. CENTRALITY OF RACE AND GENDER
One of the main objectives of the authors “is to connect the
current emphasis on negligence, physical harms, and economic damages to gender and race bias, broadly conceived.” 23 In part, the book
argues “that the gender and racial contexts of tort cases [should] be
made more visible.” 24 However, the authors go much further. They
attach “fundamental” importance to gender in analyzing tort doctrines
and evaluating potential reforms.25 The authors assume as a given
that tort law reflects “a basic pattern of male dominance,” 26 and that
“whiteness has long served as an unstated default in tort law.” 27
is largely ignored by modern legal education to the detriment of women and minorities
who will ultimately be served by law school graduates. See id. at 64-65, 70. Whether this
is true is open to question. Admittedly, the law of negligence is complex, and it takes a
great deal of time to cover all of the basic rules (relating, for example, to the reasonably
prudent person standard and relevance of customary practices) and the special cases
(such as the complex rules governing negligence liability for failure to act and premisesrelated injuries). However, most casebooks give substantial attention to both the simple
intentional torts (battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land and chattels, and conversion) and complex torts (such as misrepresentation, nuisance, defamation, and invasion
of privacy) for which intentionally tortious conduct is either required or a common path
to liability. Many of these intentional torts are tested on the widely used Multistate Bar
Examination, which makes it somewhat probable that these subjects are not ignored in law
school classes. Moreover, it seems likely that discussion of intentional tort liability plays a
prominent role in classroom coverage of many doctrines not specifically focused on intentional tort causes of action, such as punitive damages, spoliation of evidence, concerted
action liability, respondeat superior, joint and several liability, contribution, indemnity, statutes of limitations, and immunities. Some torts theorists may have largely excluded intentional torts from their research focus, but it seems doubtful that the many hundreds of
professors who teach tort law in American Bar Association-approved law schools have done
so. Today’s graduates may be better acquainted with the contours of intentional tort liability
than the authors expect. This would seem to be particularly true of students who take
Advanced Torts courses at the scores of law schools where such courses are taught, since
with respect to those types of subjects (such as fraud, libel, slander, appropriation of name
or likeness, intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, tortious
interference with contract or prospective advantage, trade libel, and slander of title),
intentional tort liability looms far larger than does negligence-based liability.
21. Id. at 20.
22. Id. at 89-90.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 7.
25. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 21.
26. Id. at 22 (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 28.
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However, the authors say “that gender and race equity should [not]
be the only goal . . . or even the most important goal of tort law in
every context.” 28 Rather, the authors “align [themselves] with [the]
‘pluralist’ scholars who regard the quest for a unified theory of torts
as futile and undesirable.” 29
A. Refining the Argument
At various junctures, the authors strive to refine their arguments
relating to tort law and race. For example, after explaining for several
pages that consciousness of race should infuse tort law, Chamallas and
Wriggins opine that “overemphasis [can be] placed on race in calculating an accident victim’s prospects for future income.” 30 In the final
chapter of the book, they point out (to the likely surprise and dismay
of many readers) that race-based life-expectancy tables are still being
used by experts who play important roles in the resolution of tort cases
involving calculations of lost earnings.31 The authors argue, quite appropriately, that “[w]hen courts rely on gender- and race-based earnings tables, it means that historical patterns of wage discrimination in
the labor market are replicated in tort awards, even though the laborforce participation of social groups may be changing rapidly.” 32
The authors also discuss tort liability related to children mixed up
at birth and given to the wrong parents. They explain that sometimes
the cases “involve reactions to race, when, for example, a child from an
unintended [sperm] donor turns out to be of a different race than the
mother or siblings.” 33 The authors argue that:
[t]o award a couple damages for emotional distress in such a
case might well reinforce racial prejudice or racial antipathy and
might be understood as making a statement that it is reasonable
for a person to reject a child for the sole reason that his skin
color or physical attributes are different from the plaintiffs’.34

The authors opine that in such cases it is justifiable for a court to use
the doctrine of proximate causation to cut off liability to avoid

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 27-29.
THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 158-70.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 112 (citation omitted).
Id.
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“undermin[ing] important public policies, such as promoting racial
equality or furthering the best interests of the child.” 35
B. Selective Perception and Related Risks
Viewed in all of its complexity, the authors’ argument seems to be
that matters of race should be taken into account by tort law when
cognizance will benefit persons who are members of classes that
have historically suffered from discrimination, but not otherwise.
Nevertheless, the risk of “selective perception,” 36 which the authors
note, is a reason why it is dangerous to focus on race at all, particularly
in a society where the demographics of majority and minority are shifting. It is easy to strike the wrong balance with regard to identityrelated matters, such as race and gender, about which many persons
feel deeply. Some readers will protest that it is better to leave an
express consideration of race out of tort law altogether. The argument
would likely be that less damage is done by treating persons simply as
persons, not as African-Americans, Whites, Hispanics, Mixed-Race
individuals, and so on.
The authors correctly note that “because the tort system is committed to individualized determinations—with few checks for systemic
bias—devaluation [of persons and their injuries based on race] is
largely invisible and unaddressed in contemporary law.” 37 This is
troubling particularly because lay juries often play a critical role in
tort litigation decision making processes. The authors explore in detail
how racial perceptions can distort even seemingly neutral inquiries,
such as those related to factual causation.38 However, they do not
explain how the risks of harm resulting from racial bias and prejudice
of jurors can be eliminated from the tort system.
A juror’s cameo appearance in tort litigation offers virtually no
opportunity for affected litigants to scrutinize, or ever know, whether
the resolution of their case was infected by impermissible bias or
prejudice based on race, gender, or other grounds. At least with
respect to judges, there is an opportunity to evaluate their conduct
over a period of years. Moreover, American judges are subject to professional discipline for discriminatory conduct involving race or gender.39
35. Id.
36. Id. at 29.
37. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 28 (citation omitted).
38. See id. at 126-27 (discussing distortion resulting from stereotyping). For a general
discussion of causation, see id. at 119-53.
39. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (2010) (providing in part that “[a]
judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias
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Perhaps ad hoc lay juries should be replaced by “professional jurors”
of the kind recommended by some commentators or by judges sitting
as fact finders.40 “England and most countries depend exclusively on
judges for the resolution of disputes, completely abandoning the jury
system.” 41 Moreover, if racial bias and prejudice are an invisible,
pervasive, and ungovernable risk in lay jury fact finding, perhaps the
use of lay juries does not make sense in multi-cultural societies. Maybe
individualized awards of damages should be replaced by some standardized mode of compensation more akin to worker’s compensation
than to the current tort system. Alternatively, perhaps lay participants
in the judicial resolution of disputes should act only in conjunction
with professional jurists, as is true in certain civil law countries where
lay and professional judges serve as members of a joint decisionmaking panel.42
C. The Difficulties of Historical Analysis
It may be impossible to analyze the history of American tort law
fairly and accurately from a racial perspective. This is true because, as
the authors candidly acknowledge, reported cases—especially recent
decisions—rarely mention the racial identities of the parties.43 Even
older judicial opinions seldom commented on such matters. Focusing
too heavily on dated tort precedents that referred to the race of the
parties carries with it obvious risks. Placing analytical weight on
such anomalies may distort both the explanation of legal history and
recommendations bearing on current practices.
or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age,
sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation”).
40. See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Cameras in the Jury Room: An
Unnecessary and Dangerous Precedent, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 865, 881 (1996) (noting that
“[s]ome commentators even suggest discarding the jury system entirely and, instead,
conducting trials before professional jurors or judges alone to improve the system’s
accountability” (citation omitted)). But see Phil Hardberger, Juries Under Siege, 30 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 1, 12 (1998) (arguing that in Texas the powers of juries have already been
excessively limited).
41. Kristy Lee Bertelsen, Note, From Specialized Courts to Specialized Juries: Calling
for Professional Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1,
2 (1998); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN B. PICKER, COMPARATIVE
LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS AND CASES ON WESTERN LAW 532 (3d ed. 2007)
(stating that “[t]he jury died in England in most civil cases for a variety of reasons”).
42. See John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental
Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195, 195-96 (discussing
the German version of the “mixed court” of lay and professional judges).
43. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 28.
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In their review of tort precedent related to race and gender, the
authors explore a number of important historical topics: the doctrine
of coverture, which merged a woman’s legal rights with those of her
husband;44 the “nervous-shock” cases, that often denied recovery for
certain types of emotion-related harm, such as miscarriages;45
wrongful-death cases, where damages were devalued because of the
plaintiff’s race;46 and wrongful-birth cases, in which resistance to
compensation for interference with the constitutional right to an
abortion emerged “in a highly gendered setting,” 47 and courts, at least
initially, tended to fix responsibility for losses relating to birth defects
solely on pregnant women.48 These discussions are always interesting
and vividly illustrated, but readers who live in a world of instant news,
and who may be reluctant to urge a court to rely on even a thirty-yearold case, may have difficulty seeing the relevance of topics related to
cases decided long ago, often before Eisenhower, Coolidge, or even
McKinley was president. The world has changed. It is interesting
to know how courts decided torts cases prior to Brown v. Board of
Education49 or the Civil Rights Act of 1964,50 but there is a valid
question about what this says about courts today.
Of course, the authors’ goals in offering these “[h]istorical
[f]rames” 51 are large. The authors intend to illustrate that issues
related to race and gender have always been a problem, and that there
are a multitude of ways in which considerations related to race or
gender can infect the tort system. This is an important and astute
observation. However, even if this viewpoint is accepted as given, there
remains the question of how to approach the problem. Presumably,
there are at least three alternatives. One option is to place a heavy
emphasis on race and gender issues. This is what Chamallas and
Wriggins do with fervor, energy, and great skill in their book. Another
option is to ignore these issues as much as possible in search of raceblind and gender-blind justice. The authors would argue that this is
impossible because “the underlying continuity of gender and racial
hierarchy . . . reproduces the same—yet different—tort law.” 52 The
44. Id. at 35-36.
45. See id. at 36-47 (discussing the impact of gender on “nervous-shock” cases).
46. See id. at 37, 52-62 (discussing the impact of race on wrongful-death cases).
47. Id. at 137.
48. See id. at 128-38 (discussing wrongful-birth cases).
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Vincent Robert Johnson, Film Review, Teaching
Transformative Jurisprudence, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 533, 536 (1991) (suggesting that Brown
was “the most important pronouncement ever made by a United States court”).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000e (2006).
51. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 35.
52. Id. at 62.
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third option is to address issues of race and gender selectively on the
assumption that a lighter touch will raise consciousness without
alienating those who must embrace the reforms that in many respects
are needed. Chamallas and Wriggins, however, are fearless advocates.
They are not concerned about alienating potential supporters of reform
by over-stressing race- and gender-based issues. The authors are
interested in radical change, not ameliorative half-steps.
III. THE VICTIM’S PERSPECTIVE
Chamallas and Wriggins distinguish their approach to tort law
from other perspectives, such as law-and-economics scholarship, which
views tort issues from the position of the decision-maker, that is, the
legislator or the judge.53 In contrast, the authors focus on the “victim’s
perspective,” and “the position of the governed.” 54 There is nothing
wrong with this. Genuine concern for a victim’s plight is dictated not
only by good tort theory, but by basic principles of humanity and
common decency. Of course, the interests of defendants must also
be considered. Justice cannot be achieved by focusing only on those
who have been wrongly harmed and neglecting the interests of those
wrongly accused of causing harm.
It is essential to remember that women and minorities are not
only victims of tortious conduct, but also alleged perpetrators of torts.
They not only sue when their privacy is invaded,55 but are sued for
invading the privacy of others.56 Pregnant women not only suffer
emotional distress when their unborn children are harmed,57 but they
cause emotional distress to fathers by negligently harming their
53. Id. at 22.
54. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
55. See, e.g., Alderson v. Bonner, 132 P.3d 1261, 1267 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006)
(permitting recovery for intrusion upon seclusion because, even though “standing on
another’s front porch and looking through a window in the door is not normally offensive,”
an uninvited man’s “peering in the window at a young female, with video camera in hand
and without announcing his presence, . . . is objectionable”); Pendleton v. Fassett, No. 08227-C, 2009 WL 2849542, at *15 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 1, 2009) (allowing an invasion of
privacy claim based on intrusion to go to trial because there was evidence that a student
was made to bare her breasts during a search for drugs).
56. See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 354-55 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a
privacy claim was stated against a wife who hired private investigators to install a hidden
camera in the bedroom of her estranged husband’s separate residence); cf. Clayton v.
Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 154, 155-56 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that there were issues of fact
as to whether a wife, who hired a private investigator to install a hidden video camera in the
bedroom she shared with her husband, invaded her husband’s privacy, and whether the
investigator was liable for knowingly assisting the wife in the commission of tortious acts).
57. See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 102-12 (discussing reproductive harm).
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unborn children.58 Women and minorities drive cars, operate small
businesses, represent clients, and heal patients. When their activities
produce losses, female and minority actors are sued and called upon
to defend their conduct. They have rights when they are defendants,
just as they have rights when they are plaintiffs. It cannot be assumed
that women or minorities are only victims, or that solicitude for those
groups necessitates a pro-plaintiff bias.
IV. APPEALING ARGUMENTS AND INTERESTING QUESTIONS
The authors raise many questions and observations that are
intellectually interesting and professionally challenging. They query
“whether certain types of injuries (e.g., emotional harm) or certain
types of damages (e.g., noneconomic damages) have been devalued in
part because of their cognitive association with women.” 59 Similarly, the authors observe that lead paint litigation, which has generally been unsuccessful in providing remedies to injured persons,60
“most often arises in low-income, predominantly minority communities, where there is a large stock of deteriorating older buildings that
pose a lead paint hazard, especially to children.” 61 Chamallas and
Wriggins also note that although most states hold that “bystander”
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress should be limited
to close family members, typically related by blood, marriage, or
adoption, “this exclusion of nontraditional families can have a negative
effect on minority families, which often do not mirror the white middleclass ideal.” 62
Some readers will doubt the accuracy or usefulness of the
authors’ assertion “that tort law reflects a masculinist viewpoint that
. . . seems oblivious or indifferent to the . . . suffering many women
experience,” 63 or that sexual abuse has been “perpetuated by malefocused standards of consent.” 64 The authors contend that intentional
58. See Tesar v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 351, 361-62 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
public policy did not preclude liability in a wrongful death action brought by a father to
recover against the mother’s automobile insurer when their unborn child was stillborn as
a result of the mother’s negligent driving).
59. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 24.
60. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 443 (R.I. 2008) (holding that
a state action related to lead paint hazards failed because there was no infringement
of a “public right” sufficient to support a cause of action for public nuisance and because
the state did not allege that the “defendants were in control of lead pigment at the time
it caused harm to children”).
61. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 29; see also id. at 138-53 (discussing
lead paint cases).
62. Id. at 114-15.
63. Id. at 25-26.
64. Id. at 26.
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tort law and the negligence doctrine have failed “to make protection of
sexual autonomy and integrity a high priority.” 65 However, the
numerous cases holding that (male) defendants are subject to liability
for transmitting sexually-related diseases,66 for spying on naked
women,67 and for various forms of clergy sexual abuse68 would seem
to prove otherwise, at least in recent decades, but also in some
earlier cases.69
Chamallas and Wriggins raise many issues that have natural
appeal to anyone who believes that there is a moral imperative to
strive to make the world a better place. Two of those issues relate to
tort liability for domestic violence and reproductive injuries.
A. Domestic Violence
The authors argue that victims of domestic violence are routinely
deprived of recourse under tort law “by short statutes of limitations,
. . . technical procedural rules . . . , and a system of insurance that
denies coverage for women abused in their homes.” 70 They also argue
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., John B. v. Superior Court, 137 P.3d 153, 161 (Cal. 2006) (holding that
liability for the tort of negligent transmission of HIV does not depend solely on actual
knowledge of infection and includes situations where the actor has reason to know of the
infection); Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 564, 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (imposing liability
for negligent transmission of herpes simplex II).
67. See, e.g., Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that the installation of hidden viewing devices constituted an invasion of the privacy of
women using a roller rink restroom, and that whether the defendant actually used the
devices to observe the women was relevant only to the issue of damages).
68. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 314, 331 (Colo. 1993) (finding, in
an action by a parishioner who entered into a sexual relationship with an associate priest
during a counseling relationship, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
conclude that the defendants, an Episcopal bishop and the diocese, owed a fiduciary duty
to the plaintiff and that they violated that duty by negligently hiring and supervising the
associate priest); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 700, 705 (N.J. 1997) (recognizing claims
for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from a
clergyman’s sexual relationship with a parishioner); Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 880
N.E.2d 892, 894, 896 (Ohio 2008) (holding that equitable estoppel is unavailable to
overcome the statute of limitations applicable to a clergy sexual abuse claim); Doe 1 ex rel.
Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, 154 S.W.3d 22, 42 (Tenn. 2005) (holding
that a church was not entitled to summary judgment on a claim for reckless infliction of
emotional distress arising from a former priest’s alleged molestation of children); John Doe
1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 734 N.W.2d 827, 831, 846 (Wis. 2007) (holding that a fraud
claim related to clergy sexual misconduct was not barred by the statute of limitations); see
also TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: HOW LAWSUITS HELPED THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE 1-10 (2008) (examining the policy
responses resulting from clergy sexual abuse litigation).
69. In a famous early example of judicial recognition of personal autonomy and
integrity in sex-related matters, the court held that a doctor could be liable for failing to
disclose that the young man he brought with him to help deliver a child lacked medical
qualifications, De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 146, 149 (Mich. 1881).
70. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 3.
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“that violence against women in the home . . . should be treated as
seriously in the law as stranger violence.” 71 Issues of this sort are
important and certainly merit open-minded consideration.
The authors accurately note that “the most formidable barrier to
tort recovery for domestic violence victims lies . . . in the law’s failure
to require or encourage insurers to provide adequate protection for
victims of intentional harms.” 72 However, despite discussing the
“moral hazard” issue and calling for “serious debate,” 73 the authors do
not offer a plan for remedying this deficiency.74 The political and social
obstacles to bringing domestic violence effectively within the scope of
standard insurance coverage are substantial. The solution to the lackof-insurance problem is not obvious.
B. Reproductive Injuries
Chamallas and Wriggins devote great attention to torts involving
sexual relations and what might be called “reproductive injuries,”
harm related to sterilization, conception, pregnancy, and birth. With
vivid illustrations drawn from actual disputes, and detailed consideration of cases that were badly decided, they probe issues related to
compensation for emotional distress and relational injuries, as well as
ancillary issues, such as consent. At some junctures the discussion is
breathtaking, such as the authors’ explanation that a federal court in
Maryland held that forced sterilization was not actionable as battery
“because it did not cause any additional physical pain, injury or illness
other than that occasioned by the C-Section procedure,” when the
plaintiff was unconsensually subjected to bilateral tubal ligation.75
V. BREAKING DOWN DOCTRINAL BOUNDARIES
Chamallas and Wriggins argue that it is necessary to rethink the
boundaries between torts and domestic relations law and between
torts and civil rights statutes.76 They contend that this must be done
in order for tort law to capture and compensate the recurrent injuries
experienced disproportionately by marginalized groups as a result of
71. Id. at 25.
72. Id. at 73.
73. Id. at 72.
74. Wriggins has explored potential remedies on other occasions. See, e.g., Jennifer
Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 122-29 (2001) (offering a remedy
to improve upon civil liability for domestic violence torts).
75. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 109-10 (quoting Robinson v. Cutchin,
140 F. Supp. 2d 488, 493 (D. Md. 2001)).
76. Id. at 20.
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family violence, workplace harassment, and sex-related injuries.77 The
authors “criticize efforts to enforce a strict separation between torts
and other domains of law.” 78
A. Cross-Boundary Tradition and Precedent
In many respects, the authors’ argument on this point is wellrooted in American legal precedent and practice. It has long been
regarded as appropriate for tort law to take cognizance of non-tort
legislative enactments in deciding which grievances to remedy. The
most obvious example is liability imposed under a negligence per se
theory based on legislation which neither expressly nor implicitly
creates a civil cause of action.79 It is also clear that, in many instances,
a plaintiff may pursue tort-style remedies under different legal
theories for harm resulting from the same course of action. For
example, the fact that a victim of a deliberate falsehood might (or
might not) be able to sue a defendant for violating the state’s deceptive
trade practices act normally does not foreclose a claim based on
common law fraud principles.80
Recognizing that provisions found in civil rights or family law
statutes are important expressions of public policy that are relevant
to the development of tort law is hardly a shocking idea. In Feltmeier
v. Feltmeier, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that its recognition that domestic violence could give rise to an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was consistent with state laws against
domestic violence.81 In Sorichetti v. City of New York, the New York
Court of Appeals similarly found that the issuance of a statutorily
authorized domestic violence protective order was an important factor
supporting its decision to impose tort liability based on failure to
provide police protection to a child.82 It is useful to remember, however,
77. Id. at 20-21.
78. Id. at 34.
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 14 (2010) (discussing some statutory violations as negligence per se); Vincent R.
Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV.
255, 264-72 (2005) (discussing negligence per se principles in the context of statutory
obligations to protect data). But see Robert F. Blomquist, The Trouble with Negligence Per
Se, 61 S.C. L. REV. 221, 285-86 (2009) (opining that “[i]t is high time for courts of last
resort to move away from the problematic intent-based approach of the negligence per se
doctrine and to an astute judicial policy analysis approach for harmonizing nonprescriptive
legislative and administrative standards with the common law negligence standard”).
80. See, e.g., VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 166-208
(2011) (discussing actions against lawyers by clients and non-clients).
81. 798 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ill. 2003).
82. 482 N.E.2d 70, 75 (N.Y. 1985) (finding that presentation to a police officer of a
protective order issued under the Family Court Act “obligates the officer to investigate and
take appropriate action”).
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that good arguments can be made against breaking down the boundaries between fields of law. Three such arguments, pertinent to the
authors’ thesis, relate to legislative resolution of divisive issues, protection of the integrity of legal principles, and inefficiency resulting from
remedial duplication.
B. Arguments for Separating Areas of Law
1. Deference to the Legislature
First, judicial recognition of a new tort remedy can undercut the
balance struck by legislation addressing a difficult social issue. This
would seem to be particularly true with regard to statutes dealing with
race and gender. In these situations, creation of a new remedy by the
judiciary may displace the bargain struck by the more democratically
responsible branches of government, the legislative and the executive.83 In the history of Anglo-American law, there has been a
tradition—often honored, sometimes ignored—of leaving the resolution
of wrenching questions to legislators, rather than to judges.84 Absent
legislative infringement of constitutional rights, judicial deference to
the legislature may be warranted by principles calling for respect of
the actions of co-equal branches of government.85
This argument generally has force only if the legislature intended
to strike an exclusive bargain. Anticipating this point, the authors
focus on the question of whether relevant civil rights legislation includes language expressly preempting, or not preempting, common
law remedies.86 If a law provides that common law remedies are not
83. This argument is weakest if judges are elected, rather than appointed. This is particularly true in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling that judges and judicial candidates
may announce their views on controversial issues. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765, 768, 774-80 (2002) (holding that rules of judicial ethics that bar judges and
judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues violate
the First Amendment).
84. See Percy H. Winfield, The Foundation of Liability in Tort, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
3-4 (1927) (stating that, traditionally, “[i]f the judges thought that a new remedy was
necessary, they invented it, unless the invention of it would have shocked public opinion,
in which event they left [the task] to Parliament”).
85. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 9 (4th ed.
2009), stating that:
[I]t is often urged that certain questions are best left to the legislature
because of its ability to gather facts through the legislative hearing process,
to craft comprehensive solutions to broad-ranging questions, or to represent
the will of the public on highly controversial issues. Presumably, the policy
favoring deference to co-equal branches of government has less force where
legislative or executive action is likely to be distorted by the lobbying of
special interest groups, the under-representation of victims in the decisionmaking process, or lack of adequate funding.
Id.
86. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 80-81.
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affected by the passage of a statute, there is little reason for courts
to defer to the legislature. The authors point out, however, that
even courts faced with statutes containing non-preemption language
have resisted recognition of tort remedies for race- and genderrelated discrimination.87
2. Doctrinal Integrity
Second, there are some boundaries between fields of law that are
important to recognize because they protect the integrity of legal
principles. A useful example can be drawn from the context of defective
product-related tort claims. Suppose that a product purchased by the
plaintiff turns out to be ineffective or does not work at all, but causes
neither personal injury nor damage to other property. It is widely
agreed that the plaintiff’s only recourse is under contract law, and the
terms of the parties’ bargain cannot be circumvented by suing under
tort principles.88 Otherwise, “contract law would drown in a sea of
tort.” 89 A tort remedy is denied to the plaintiff in order to ensure that
contract principles have meaning. Purely economic product-related
losses fall on the contract side of the boundary line which sometimes
runs between torts and contracts. This arrangement works because
the Uniform Commercial Code has been ubiquitously adopted.90 Even
if the parties have not bargained about the allocation of purely economic losses, the UCC supplies default principles to resolve disputes
about who should pay.91
Conceptually, it is possible that expanding the reach of tort
liability to encompass certain forms of impermissible discrimination
could “drown” some civil rights statutes in a “sea of tort” by providing
more generous terms of recovery. This would be a significant risk in
cases where a tort cause of action (such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress) is interpreted to cover the same basic type of
conduct for which a statute has already defined the conditions and
terms of legal remedies. In this type of situation, supplanting statutory
civil rights or domestic relations legislation with common law principles would reverse the normal trend of legal development. The tendency in American law has been to replace rag-tag common law
87. Id. at 80.
88. See Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule,
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 549-52 (2009) (discussing products liability).
89. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986).
90. Cf. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 171 (Wis. 2005) (holding that the
economic loss rule did not bar tort remedies related to injuries arising under a service
contract because no body of law similar to the UCC applies to service contracts).
91. Id.
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decisions addressing important social issues in a piecemeal fashion
with comprehensive statutory solutions92—not vice versa.
Still, it is hard not to sympathize with the idea that tort law
should be expanded to provide remedies for types of race- and genderrelated discrimination for which there is, in many cases, no statutory
avenue for redress. This might include such forms of conduct as discrimination against persons based on “how they perform their identity”
by resisting stereotypes, as in the case of effeminate men, or resisting
assimilation, such as by adopting “ethnic” hairstyles.93 If a plaintiff can
prove to a jury that such discrimination amounts to extreme and outrageous conduct deliberately calculated by the defendant to victimize
the plaintiff, recovery for intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress, under well-established tort principles,94 should not be barred
simply because no statute has created a parallel remedy.
However, the authors argue that tort law should do much more
than take a “gap filler” 95 approach to workplace harassment. They
argue in favor of pervasive remedies under tort law which reflect the
public policies found in anti-discrimination statutes. More specifically,
they urge that tort law can borrow from Title VII to give meaning
to the outrageous conduct requirement in tort actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress.96 The authors opine that, at
present, intricate tort doctrines send a clear message that tort law
offers little in the way of redress for domestic violence and workplace harassment.97
3. Duplication and Inefficiency
Third, any expansion of common law remedies into the provinces
now occupied by civil rights law and domestic relations statutes would
pose a risk of remedial duplication and inefficiency. These types of
costs are sometimes significant because there are limited judicial
resources available for the resolution of disputes.98 In other contexts,
certain types of claims have sometimes been rejected on the ground
92. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 85, at 94 (stating that the “Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act is a good example of the law’s tendency to replace common-law developments
with statutory ‘solutions’ ”).
93. See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 77 (noting, for example, “the African
American woman who wears her hair in braids or corn rows”).
94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 45 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (defining the requirements of an action for
intentional or reckless infliction of emotional disturbance).
95. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 78.
96. Id. at 85.
97. Id. at 86-87.
98. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 85, at 9 (discussing the importance of administrative convenience and efficiency in the formulation of tort law).
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that they are duplicative. For example, in the legal malpractice field,
a judge may dismiss a breach of contract claim in a suit that also
alleges negligence, if the breach of contract claim amounts to nothing
more than an argument that the representation was incompetent and
negligent.99 “False light” invasion of privacy is sometimes not recognized as a tort because it overlaps too much with well-established principles of defamation law.100 And, touching someone in a sexual manner
has been deemed not to constitute an actionable invasion of privacy
because offensive touching is actionable as battery and “the tort of
invasion of privacy was not intended to be duplicative of some other
tort.” 101 In determining whether tort law should routinely provide
remedies for forms of discrimination already addressed by state and
federal legislation, some account must be taken of the costs of systemic
inefficiency resulting from remedial duplication. In The Measure of
Injury, the authors do not address this issue, focusing instead on the
importance of providing better civil remedies for workplace discrimination and domestic violence.
VI. COMPENSATING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A large part of Chamallas and Wriggins’s argument is aimed at
expanding the reach of the two independent torts actions offering
compensation for purely emotional suffering: intentional infliction of
emotional distress,102 sometimes called the tort of outrage,103 and negligent infliction of emotional distress.104 The authors’ contention is that
these causes of action have the potential to redress a wide range of
losses that are particularly significant to women and racial minorities.
Despite the fact that the authors compellingly state their case,
their quest faces great obstacles. With respect to actions for intentional
99. See Oberg v. Burke, No. 040721A, 2007 WL 1418546, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2007)
(noting a breach of contract claim cannot be characterized apart from a malpractice claim
on the facts); Sitar v. Sitar, 854 N.Y.S.2d 536, 538 (App. Div. 2008) (dismissing the
plaintiff’s claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation because they arose from the
same facts as the plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim and the plaintiff did not allege
distinct damages).
100. See Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 579-80 (Tex. 1994) (refusing to recognize
false light because defamation encompasses most false light claims and false light “lacks
many of the procedural limitations that accompany actions for defamation, thus unacceptably increasing the tension that already exists between free speech constitutional
guarantees and tort law”).
101. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d 156, 162 (Fla. 2003).
102. See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 66-87 (discussing intentional infliction of emotional distress in relationship to domestic violence and workplace harassment).
103. See, e.g., Klinger v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C10-5546RJB, 2010 WL 4237849, at *6
(W.D. Wash. 2010).
104. See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 89-117 (discussing negligence,
generally).
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infliction of emotional harm, many states, as the authors acknowledge,105 articulate the requirements for recovery in exceptionally demanding terms. It will be difficult or impossible to reverse this course
of development because the tort of outrage has been much litigated
and the accretion of unfriendly precedent is substantial. Moreover,
insofar as negligent infliction is concerned, the law (viewed nationally)
is so muddled106 that it is hard to imagine that this tort will someday
offer a reliable path to recovery for seriously injured plaintiffs in cases
not involving observation of the tortiously caused death or serious
injury of a family member. However, the authors can take comfort
in the fact that the Supreme Court of Tennessee recently opined that
“the development of the law in the United States relating to negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims has been to enlarge rather than
to restrict the circumstances amenable to the filing of a negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim.” 107
If there is one obstacle the authors underestimate, it is the
difficulty of quantifying emotional distress damages. Rather, the
authors argue that judicial reluctance to provide compensation for
emotional distress “cannot be explained or justified solely by the
difficulty of measuring intangible injuries or finding a logical stopping
point for liability.” 108
Many types of tort damages, such as lost wages, medical
expenses, and the costs of repairing or replacing property, can be
ascertained with reasonable certainty.109 The bills, receipts, and
written cost estimates may be gathered, and the total added up.
Defense counsel may dispute the reasonableness of such expenditures or the accuracy of the numbers, but the jury nevertheless has
access to concrete evidence to guide its assessment of how much
damage was caused by the defendant’s tortious conduct. This is
even true with respect to out-of-pocket costs related to emotional
distress, such as amounts spent on counseling and prescriptions.
Indeed, even with regard to “parasitic damages” for pain and suffering
105. Id. at 78 (stating that “[s]ome states set the bar of proof of ‘outrageousness’ so high
that they allow recovery only in extremely aggravated [cases]”).
106. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 85, at 569 (stating that “[n]o area of tort law is
more unsettled than compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress” and that
“decisions continually restate the criteria for recovery, and there are often substantial
differences in the requirements, or their interpretation, from one jurisdiction to the next,
and within any one jurisdiction at different times”).
107. Eskin v. Bartee, 262 S.W.3d 727, 734, 738 (Tenn. 2008) (holding that family
members stated a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress even though they did
not see the event that injured a child).
108. THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 21.
109. Note, however, that the authors argue many types of economic damages, such as
future medical expenses and loss of future earning capacity, are “notoriously hard to
measure.” Id. at 179.
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incidental to a physical injury,110 a jury can make some comparison to
out-of-pocket losses in determining how much to award for intangible
suffering. It is not uncommon for lawyers negotiating the settlement
of cases to talk about general damages for emotional distress being
calculated as a certain multiple of special out-of-pocket damages.
In contrast, there is little to guide a jury’s assessment of the
proper amount of compensation for purely emotional suffering.111 An
award can have more to do with the eloquence or effectiveness of
counsel, the identity of the plaintiff,112 or the efforts of “tort reformers”
decrying lawsuit “abuse” 113 than with the amount of harm actually
caused by the defendant. These realities create a serious risk that
similarly affected plaintiffs may be treated very differently, and that
emotional distress awards may vary radically from one case to the
next. Presumably, to address these concerns as well as the prospect of
“runaway verdicts,” many states, in certain types of cases, have capped
awards for noneconomic losses114 or denied recovery for emotional
distress not resulting in out-of-pocket expenditures.115 Moreover,
scholars argue that awards for psychic suffering are inherently
suspect because emotional distress is simply not monetizable.116
Not surprisingly, Chamallas and Wriggins address these points.
They argue that caps on noneconomic damages, while neutral on
110. See Kennedy v. Carriage Cemetery Servs., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 925, 934 (D. Nev.
2010) (distinguishing “parasitic damages” for emotional harm from damages that are
recoverable in actions for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress).
111. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1051 (2000) (stating that awards for
emotional and physical “pain are not easy to evaluate because there is no objective
criterion for judgment”).
112. See id. (opining that a “claim of [emotional or physical] pain is . . . a serious threat
to the defendant since, lacking any highly objective components, it permits juries to roam
through their biases in setting an award”).
113. In Texas, tort reform battles are sometimes waged on busy highways. Roughly a
decade ago, a group called Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse erected billboards saying
“Lawsuit Abuse. We All Pay. We All Lose.” It was virtually impossible to reach the courthouse without seeing one of these signs. I served on a panel of prospective jurors in a
medical malpractice case. During voir dire, the plaintiff’s attorney asked whether any of
the potential jurors had seen the billboards decrying “lawsuit abuse.” Forty-nine of the fifty
potential jurors raised their hands. The case settled before a jury was empaneled.
114. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2010) (providing that in an action “against
a health care provider based on professional negligence,” a plaintiff may not recover more
than $250,000 in noneconomic damages as compensation for “pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage”); see also
DOBBS, supra note 111, at 1071-73 (discussing capping statutes).
115. See, e.g., Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 343, 350 (N.H. 1986) (allowing recovery for
emotional distress damages in a wrongful birth cause of action only to the extent that they
result in “tangible pecuniary losses,” such as medical expenses or counseling fees).
116. Joseph H. King, Jr., Counting Angels and Weighing Anchors: Per Diem
Arguments for Noneconomic Personal Injury Tort Damages, 71 TENN. L. REV. 1, 8-27 (2003).
He offers examples of per diem arguments and opposes their use “because they exploit the
suggestible nature” of jurors and “compound the illogic of attempting to monetize pain and
suffering into a damages remedy.” Id. at 11.
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their face, have a disparate and devastating impact on women and
minorities because it is harder for such plaintiffs to prove economic
losses, and therefore recovery of noneconomic losses is more important.117 They further contend that the argument that money damages
cannot repair intangible harms is flawed, because that is also true
of certain types of economic losses, for which recovery of damages is
ordinarily not capped.118 Some readers will find the authors’ arguments on these points persuasive.
VII. OTHER IMPORTANT QUESTIONS
As Chamallas and Wriggins explain, their book is focused on race
and gender, and they “have not wrestled with other important dimensions of personal identity, such as sexual orientation, disability, and
social class.” 119 It would be interesting to know what they think about
those issues, and about whether focusing on those matters would
cause the authors to refine or modify their gender- and race-based
critique of tort law. Moreover, it is intriguing to consider how the
authors would address other important contemporary issues, such
as those arising in the legal malpractice context. At many junctures,
the authors explore the conduct and responsibility of medical professionals. Presumably, similar questions could be raised about the
conduct of lawyers.
CONCLUSION
Judged by any fair standard, The Measure of Injury is an
important book. Even those who disagree with the authors’ sustained
emphasis on race and gender must acknowledge that this volume
addresses important questions about the American tort system in a
thoughtful and intellectually rigorous fashion.
The Measure of Injury presents a coherent vision for radically
reshaping tort law. To the extent that the authors’ arguments are
found to be persuasive, The Measure of Injury may play a key role in
revolutionizing the compensation of intentional injuries and accidents.

117. See THE MEASURE OF INJURY, supra note 1, at 170-82 (discussing caps on noneconomic compensatory damages).
118. Id. at 180.
119. Id. at 23.

